Potential Adherents of Radical Islam in Europe: Methods of Recruitment and the Age of Perpetrators in Acts of Terror by Nikola Brzica
161
Review Article
Received: 2 October 2017
Potential Adherents of Radical Islam in Europe: 
Methods of Recruitment and the Age of Perpetrators 
in Acts of Terror 
NIKOLA BRZICA
Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb
Summary
This article’s objective is to categorize potential jihadists in Europe and pro-
vide an overview of contemporary methods for their recruitment. Taking into 
account the ubiquity of the Internet and social networking platforms, and the 
fact that younger generations are spending an ever increasing amount of time 
using contemporary communication technology, this article focuses on those 
recruitment methods that make use of social networking platforms and mobile 
applications for the spread of extremist propaganda, as well as for communi-
cation with potential adherents. An analysis of the age structure of individu-
als involved in the planning and carrying out of terrorist acts in Europe from 
November of 2015 to September of 2017 supports a hypothesis that contem-
porary recruitment methods are especially effective in targeting a younger 
demographic. In addition, this article negates the importance of traditional 
physical exposure to radical behavior, which serves to explain the increasing 
number of terrorist attacks in Europe conducted by radicalized citizens of Eu-
ropean countries.
Keywords: Islamic Radicalism, Terrorism, Jihad, Foreign Fighters, Islamic 
State
Introduction
In recent years, Europe has been faced with an increasing number of terrorist attacks 
linked to Islamic radicalism. Although numerous jihadist1 attacks were planned and 
1 The Encyclopedia of Islam defines jihad as “military action with the object of the expansion 
of Islam, or if need be, its defence” (Quareeshi, 2016: 15). The author recognizes the existence 
of different interpretations of the term “jihad”, and therefore emphasizes that the term “jihad” 
in this article is used to describe the application of violence, and the term “jihadist” refers to an 
individual who participates in the planning or execution of terrorist acts.
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conducted prior to 2015 (Nesser et al., 2016: 4),2 2015 seems to have become some-
what of a watershed year, with the terrorist attack in Paris in January of 2015 and 
the multiple attacks in the same city in November of the same year sparking wide-
spread discussion of this issue. The topic was quickly propelled into the public spot-
light, and consequently, politicians, security experts, and the media began to draw 
connections between the attacks and the possible appearance of foreign fighters 
(French citizens who had returned from the Syrian and Iraqi war zones with com-
bat experience) and radicalized French citizens of Islamic background, who despite 
not having previously had direct contact with the conflicts in the Middle East, were 
ready to kill and die for their beliefs. Furthermore, after the Paris attacks, a trend of 
increasing frequency of both unsuccessful and successful terrorist attacks by fellow 
adherents of a radical Islamic ideology in other European countries (doubtlessly in-
spired by the success of their comrades in France) was recognized. It soon emerged 
that between 2011 and 2016, more than 5000 European Muslims travelled to Syria 
to participate in combat. During the same period, more than 1600 individuals were 
arrested in investigations related to jihadist activity within Europe (excluding the 
UK), which represented a 70% increase when compared to the immediately preced-
ing five year period (according to the EUROPOL TE-SAT Report, 2017: 20).
As of April of 2017, 20 to 30% of foreign fighters had already departed Iraq 
and Syria, while 30% of European foreign fighters had already returned to their 
countries of origin – producing a number of roughly 1200 European foreign fighter 
returnees (Reed et al., 2017: 6).
From the beginning of 2014 to the end of 2016, jihadist attacks in Europe 
claimed 273 lives, which is a larger number than the totals of all previous years 
combined (Nesser et al., 2016: 3). According to EUROPOL, 135 individuals were 
killed in jihadist attacks within the EU (EUROPOL TE-SAT Report, 2017: 22), and 
up until the writing of this article, the number of fatalities caused by jihadist attacks 
on European soil during 2017 was 140.3
Article Objective and Initial Hypothesis
The objective of this article is to categorize potential jihadists in Europe into four 
categories and give an overview of contemporary methods for their recruitment, in 
particular with respect to the targeted demographic group. The initial hypothesis is 
that contemporary recruitment methods for potential perpetrators of terrorist acts in 
2 According to Nesser, data exists on 90 planned and conducted European terrorist attacks that 
have been linked to Al Qaeda or other jihadist groups in the period from 1995 to 2011.
3 Data is from publicly available sources detailing attacks that happened in European countries 
in 2017. 
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the name of a radical ideology are more effective when applied to a younger demo-
graphic, specifically one that is less than 30 years old. The research conducted prior 
to the writing of this article lasted several months, from May to September of 2017, 
using a qualitative methodological approach and data which was primarily found in 
secondary sources. The research began with a comprehensive analysis of the exist-
ing literature, consisting principally of the relevant academic publications that deal 
with extremism, radicalization and recruitment. Data used in the analysis of identi-
fied perpetrators of radical Islamic terrorist acts was collected from applicable web-
sites, media statements of relevant state officials, the publicly available reports of 
relevant European and NATO bodies, as well as the Security and Intelligence Agen-
cies of NATO and EU member states.
Limitations of the Article
Existing scientific research regarding foreign fighters (or more broadly on transna-
tional insurgents) is generally limited to their appearance as a global phenomenon, 
or to their role and contribution in a global jihadist movement. This research is based 
on identified trends and exact numbers in order to analyze the general phenomena, 
with a significant portion of the research being focused on the internal motivation of 
individuals for participating in jihad and the security implications that result. 
For the purpose of the theoretical examination in this article, a large range of 
scientific and expert works have been used, while for the purpose of the analysis 
of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, data about the perpetrators published in the 
media has been used. Although every collected piece of data has been checked with 
multiple, publicly available sources, one of the potential limitations of the article 
can be the veracity of this data. In addition, another potential limitation of the arti-
cle is the reality that a significant portion of the available literature dealing with ji-
hadists is focused on the means by which individuals are radicalized, whereas most 
authors neglect the important distinction between radicalization and recruitment 
(which this article will attempt to differentiate).
Finally, even though the exact values regarding the perpetrators of terrorist acts 
and their victims represent an appropriate quantitative metric, the effectiveness of 
contemporary methods of recruitment is difficult to scientifically quantify given the 
lack of relevant, publicly available data. As more details regarding these processes 
emerge, this issue will surely be the topic of future scientific research.
Categorization of Potential Adherents of Islamic Radicalism
A detailed analysis of factors, such as the membership of potential jihadists in cer-
tain demographic groups, is important for a comprehensive understanding of in-
ternal motivations, but also the vulnerability of potential jihadists to recruitment 
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methods which are used by radical organizations resembling the so-called Islamic 
State (IS). It is also necessary to keep in mind that terrorist attacks by radical Islam-
ists have been a recurring security issue for a longer period than is examined in this 
article, and that attacks have occurred at broadly dispersed locations globally, not 
only under the auspices of IS, but also of several other jihadist groups. This sug-
gests that a significant decentralization in operational terrorist structures has oc-
curred and as a result, we have progressed to the current manifestation of Islamic 
Terrorism – reciprocally independent radicalized groups and/or individuals, who 
are geographically and quite often logistically autonomous, and who are able to 
operationalize jihad with little or no external assistance. In light of this reality, it is 
necessary to pay careful attention to contemporary methods of jihadist recruitment, 
which includes a scientifically sound examination of the effectiveness of specific 
techniques on targeted demographic groups.
However, this is easier said than done. As John Berger and Bill Strathearn con-
clude in their analysis, it is relatively simple to identify the tens of thousands of 
social networking platform users who exhibit an interest in radical ideology, but it 
is very difficult to determine the ones who deserve additional scrutiny (Berger and 
Strathearn, 2013: 3). The ability of governments to identify potential perpetrators 
of terrorist acts motivated by a radical ideology, and in doing so to prevent such at-
tacks from taking place, is very difficult to evaluate in an objective manner, prima-
rily because the details of prevented attacks are often not publicized, or are made 
public after a protracted silence.
Nevertheless, the study of the available data detailing recent attacks and the 
identification of emerging trends can lead to profound insights. In analyzing pub-
lished data describing individuals who perpetrated terrorist attacks in Europe rang-
ing from January of 2015 to the most recent attacks in Barcelona in August and 
London in September of 2017, and then applying this analysis to a broader context, 
it is possible to categorize potential jihadists into the four categories illustrated in 
Figure 1.
The first category of potential adherents of Islamic Radicalism is made up of 
foreign fighter returnees, who are either citizens of one of the EU member states 
or citizens of one of the Western Balkan countries. The potential security threat 
posed by these individuals has relatively successfully been mitigated by identifica-
tion, surveillance and prevention (Brzica, 2015: 34). Remarkably, although the term 
“Foreign Fighters” has been in use in both NATO and EU parlance for several years, 
a universally accepted definition does not exist. David Malet defines foreign fight-
ers as non-citizens of countries in which conflicts are taking place, who join insur-
gent forces in civil wars (Malet, 2015: 455). Thomas Hegghammer elaborates this 
definition to exclude mercenaries, and according to his thinking, foreign fighters are 
best defined as individuals who travel from their (western) home countries to fight 
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or receive military training (in the west or elsewhere) in organizations which share 
their ideological beliefs. Furthermore, Hegghammer recognizes that these individu-
als are not members of any country’s armed forces, but they are members of radical 
groups and play active roles within them. Additionally, they do not have citizenship 
of the countries within which the conflict is taking place and do not receive finan-
cial compensation for their services (Gates and Podder, 2015: 107).
Following the European Parliament’s first quarter of 2015 estimate that be-
tween three and five thousand foreign fighter returnees had returned to Europe, the 
Council of Europe addressed this issue, stating that a sustained and comprehensive 
approach was necessary, and that the primary responsibility for mitigating efforts 
would fall on the member states of the EU (EPRS Report, 2016: 4).
After a bomb attack in a museum in Bruxelles on May 24, 2014 by foreign 
fighter returnee and French citizen Mehdi Nemmouche, the French Minister of In-
terior Bernard Cazenueve described the situation regarding foreign fighter returnees 
as a ticking time bomb. Interestingly, the French Security and Intelligence Services’ 
assessment of the number of foreign fighter returnees in France at that time was 300 
(at the end of 2013). More recent estimates, however, place the number of French 
citizens participating in jihad to be over 900, with the majority acting under the 
auspices of two key groups – Jabhat al-Nusrah and IS, previously known as ISIL.4
According to some sources, roughly 30% of all foreign fighters eventually re-
turn to their home countries with improved skills and an increased motivation to 
conduct conventional and non-conventional attacks (ICCT Report, 2016: 4). Quite 
often, radicalized returnees maintain links with organizations such as Al Qaeda and 
IS, and spread their radical ideology in their home countries. Unfortunately, secu-
4 Islamic State is a radical Islamic group previously known as ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant – and also known as “Daesh”, a name that its adherents consider offensive and de-
grading.
Figure 1.
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rity and intelligence services face difficulties in assessing the skills and abilities 
of individual foreign fighter returnees, let alone their degree of radicalization and 
willingness to act. Key to this assessment are the reasons for the foreign fighter’s 
return, whether they are due to disillusionment with jihad and a desire for a return to 
normality, or feigned de-radicalization for the purpose of continued jihadist activity, 
albeit in new surroundings.
It is possible to determine the number of foreign fighters from individual coun-
tries from publicly available data. The Combating Terrorism Center at the presti-
gious West Point military academy has been monitoring and collecting publicly 
published data regarding foreign fighters originating from western countries who 
have travelled to Syria and Iraq for several years, as has the International Centre for 
the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence.
Reports identify the average age of foreign fighters to be 255 and they support 
the initial hypothesis of this article that the younger demographic, particularly un-
employed and frustrated males younger than 30 with low self-esteem, are particu-
larly susceptible to manipulation by organizations such as IS. Consequently, such 
organizations recognize fertile ground for recruitment and conversion in precisely 
this demographic group, and thus target them with focused and forceful propagan-
da. This article will evaluate the validity of this hypothesis, as it is crucial to under-
standing contemporary methods of jihadist recruitment.
According to a EUROPOL Report from 2016, most foreign fighters who return 
to Europe use the same routes used to travel to their respective war zones, or more 
precisely, they use indirect flights from Turkey and other European countries. The 
same report recognizes that a certain number of returning jihadists use the so-called 
“Balkan Route”.
A second category of potential adherents of radical Islamism consists of radi-
calized citizens of European countries who have not participated in jihad outside of 
their country of origin. They may either be radicalized youth of Islamic background 
or converts to Islam. This category encompasses many self-radicalized perpetrators 
of “lone-wolf” attacks.
Recent terrorist attacks which have proven links to jihadist organizations de-
monstrate that terrorist propaganda has been focused specifically on this category 
of potential perpetrators of terrorist attacks, primarily through English language 
propaganda materials, usually published on the Internet (online magazines such as 
Inspire, published by the AQAP organization, or the Dabiq, Dar al-Islam and Ru-
5 Data showing that the average age of perpetrators is between 22 and 27 can be found in mul-
tiple research studies, for example Neumann and Rogers (2007: 50-52), and Meleagrou and Ka-
derbhai (2017a: 62).
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miyah online magazines published by IS), which are also often translated into the 
languages of target populations (Albanian and Bosnian for example). In addition 
to these online magazines, IS has been successful in creating striking, high quality 
propaganda content. This content is characterized by sophisticated video process-
ing, with use of imaginative, high resolution video materials.
The representatives of this category and their intention are somewhat more dif-
ficult to identify. Revelations made by former NSA contractor and CIA employee 
Edward Snowden have exposed the ability of the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) in the UK and the US’s National Security Agency (NSA) to 
recognize and monitor frequent viewers of radical Islamic propaganda materials on 
the Internet, by detecting IP addresses that visit known propaganda websites (un-
less masking techniques/technology that hinder tracking are used). Additionally, in 
many cases a key role in detection is played by people in the radicalized individual’s 
immediate environment (friends, relatives, teachers, psychologists, clerics), who 
are the first to notice changes in the radicalized individual’s behavior. Because of 
this, public education and awareness programs play an important role in detection 
and prevention, as does a quality network of informants to Law Enforcement and 
Security and Intelligence agencies. However, it is important to keep in mind that the 
majority of countries approach the radicalization of their citizens as an exclusively 
national issue, and thus a range of approaches to this problem exist. 
A third category of potential adherents of radical Islamism, which is perhaps 
the most difficult to detect and monitor, consists of radicalized individuals who 
travel to Europe to commit terrorist acts. This category encompasses Radical Islam-
ists purposely infiltrated among refugees and migrants, usually at the points of ori-
gin of migrant waves. The 2015-2016 migrant wave that swept Europe highlighted 
Europe’s unpreparedness in facing such mass migrations, as the security structures 
of EU member states were ineffective in preventing the infiltration of the represen-
tatives of this category into Europe.
A fourth category of potential adherents of radical Islamism are migrants who 
have arrived to the EU, and who will potentially become radicalized due to their 
frustration with living conditions at their final destinations and in combination with 
exposure to radical jihadist propaganda online or via adherents of radical ideo-
logies among established European Islamic communities. This least well known 
category consists of individuals who have fled their war-torn countries of origin in 
search of a better life. Some may have actively participated in conflicts, and a ma-
jority have probably suffered psychological trauma (and other horrors) that moti-
vated their migration to western countries. 
The latest EUROPOL report (TE-SAT Report, 2017: 6) anticipates the con-
tinuation of migrant arrivals in Europe, from existing and new conflict zones. IS 
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has already recognized the opportunity provided by the migrant wave to infiltrate 
its followers with an intent to commit terrorist acts in Europe, so the possibility of 
this reoccurring, whether by IS or by another radical organization, cannot be ruled 
out.
Contemporary Recruitment Methods 
There is a lack of scientific research regarding contemporary methods of jihadist 
recruitment, particularly those that make use of social networking platforms. One 
can assume that this can be explained by the simple fact that social networking plat-
forms are a relatively recent phenomenon, but also by the fact that these types of 
activities are largely undertaken in secret (Shuck, 2015: 46). However, many arti-
cles identify the activities of extremist organizations on the Internet as one of the 
primary security issues of today (Frampton et al., 2017: 22).
The beginning of 2016 was marked by grandiose claims that IS would be obli-
terated from cyberspace by the end of the year (Forno and Joshi, 2016). However, 
almost two years later, it is apparent that the presence of IS and other extremist or-
ganizations on the Internet continues to be a major problem, primarily because it 
enables the jihadist network (including supporters) to constantly evolve and expand 
(Frampton et al., 2017: 31). It is irrefutable that the Internet facilitates rapid spread 
of information to broad audiences, while also enabling quick changes between com-
munications platforms and almost instantaneous migration from one virtual loca-
tion to another. In addition, the Internet has proven to be an excellent instrument in 
the hands of extremist organizations for propaganda dissemination, as well as the 
radicalization and recruitment of new adherents. It has demonstrated remarkable re-
silience in cases where extremist propaganda has been detected and removed (with 
user accounts deleted in some cases), only to reappear on other web locations al-
most immediately (ibid.: 32). 
In order to gain an understanding of contemporary methods of potential jihad-
ist recruitment, it is necessary to comprehend the power and impact that a terrorist 
organization can have on an individual using these methods (primarily via the In-
ternet, social network platforms and mobile applications). In this context, it is im-
portant to once again stress one of the limitations of this article, and that is the fact 
that the majority of available literature is focused on the analysis of contemporary 
methods of online radicalization, with a majority of authors failing to make a dis-
tinction between radicalization and recruitment. More precisely, it can be said that 
an individual can be exposed to a process of cognitive radicalization online – lead-
ing to acceptance of the radical movement’s beliefs and giving them outward sup-
port, but radicalization will not always result in the individual committing a terrorist 
act in support of a radical ideology. 
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In their early research on recruitment and mobilization of adherents of Islam-
ist ideology in Europe, Peter Neumann and Brooke Rogers (2007) identified three 
key functions of the Internet in this process. The first function is to illustrate and 
reinforce ideological messages which potential adherents have previously been ex-
posed to in private encounters. Secondly, the Internet enables potential adherents to 
surround themselves and contact with like minded individuals (virtually), as well as 
allowing them to reach out beyond their immediate (physical) circle of friends and 
ideological associates. Finally, the Internet is an environment that allows an indi-
vidual to easily demonstrate his allegiance to an objective, as well as the means with 
which that objective should be realized (ibid.: 50-52). The above mentioned authors 
conclude their research with the prediction that the role of the Internet in recruiting 
potential adherents to radical ideologies in Europe will play an even more promi-
nent role in the future. The exponential growth of forums and websites in European 
languages which seek to recruit converts, but also second and third generation Eu-
ropean Muslims, prove that this is the case (ibid.: 52).
Furthermore, Neumann’s research on Al Qaeda cells in Europe concludes that 
exposure to terrorist thinking speeds up the radicalization process by “normalizing” 
a radical ideology (Neumann, 2008: 55). Max Abrahms identifies two schools of 
thought regarding the influence of social media platforms on the adherents of radi-
cal ideologies. The first school of thought considers the effects of IS’s recruitment 
of new adherents via social networking platforms to be an unprecedented success 
and that as a result, security services must direct all efforts to combatting IS efforts 
on social networking platforms. The second school of thought recognizes that the 
effects on recruitment are impressive, but that the brutality of IS’s online propa-
ganda is ultimately counterproductive because it unifies international efforts against 
IS, which then prevents IS from achieving its objectives by diplomatic and military 
means (Little, 2015). These schools of thought are complemented by some theorists 
who consider that the rise of online activity (to include use of social networking 
platforms) by extremists has enabled security services to gain a better understand-
ing of the composition and structure of extremist organizations, as well as their way 
of thinking (Briggs and Silverman, 2014: 16).
Several newer articles, whose conclusions have been supported by extensive 
research, have been authored by John Berger. In one of his most publicized works 
“Who Matters Online: Measuring influence, evaluating content and countering vio-
lent extremism in online social networks”, the authors designed a framework for 
measuring the influence and engagement of individual user accounts that promote 
a radical ideology and their followers (Berger and Strathearn, 2013). Newer con-
tributions to Berger’s scientific opus have additionally shed light on the ways that 
radical organizations such as IS use the Internet and social networking platforms 
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to strengthen their messages and exponentially increase their engagement (Berger, 
2015a: 40).
Shuck conducted a qualitative analysis of IS and Al Qaeda in order to identify 
the breadth, means and objectives of Internet use by the two terrorist organizations. 
The results of this research showed that the Internet is being increasingly used as a 
propaganda platform, in order to radicalize and recruit new adherents (Shuck, 2015: 
2). According to Shuck, both organizations use contemporary technologies (the In-
ternet and social networking platforms) in the same manner as politicians and com-
mercial organizations do, but he makes the observation that IS is more effective 
and interactive in engaging its target audience,6 and it does so primarily via social 
networks (ibid.: 57).
IS has allocated significant resources to implementing an effective recruitment 
strategy (Berger, 2015b: 19). Their contemporary recruitment strategy is based on 
online access to a targeted demographic, and is conducted in several phases, start-
ing with the introduction of its narrative, the shaping of social networks, and ending 
with a call for action (travel to a war zone or the execution of terrorist acts). The 
extremist narrative used to recruit new adherents consists of multiple ideological 
messages which have a common theme: they offer a way to a better world, and/or 
the realization of a better self (Charnock and Bouzar, 2017). These manipulative 
methods are particularly addressed at an under 30 target audience, because indivi-
duals in this group are often in search of purpose, social acceptance, and acceptance 
by their idols (ibid.).
The German security services contend that there is no doubt that jihadist 
groups will use every available opportunity to commit terrorist acts, but that in the 
past several years, the planning and execution of such acts was perpetrated by radi-
calized individuals or small groups. Contributing to this phenomenon were interna-
tional and national efforts to prevent travel to war zones and participation in jihad 
by radicalized individuals, but also to prevent calls to conduct terrorist attacks in 
(Western) home countries in jihadist propaganda, which resulted in a geographical 
shift in targeting.
These calls, which no longer appeal for jihad exclusively in war zones (but 
rather seek to spread jihad globally) are becoming increasingly frequent as IS loses 
territory in Iraq and Syria. The rapid adoption by jihadists of new information tech-
nologies to spread these calls to jihad is best illustrated by EUROPOL reporting, 
which identifies mobile applications as the preferred method of communication be-
6 For example, the author states that IS sympathizers are not only limited to following user ac-
counts that promote a radical ideology, they actively communicate with those who publish these 
propaganda materials and with each other. Additionally, they disseminate these materials further, 
thus increasing the pool of potential followers.
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tween jihadists in war zones, but also between jihadist organizations and potential 
recruits in the West (TE-SAT Report, 2017: 29).
Before an individual, representative of any of the categories of potential jihad-
ists outlined above, becomes radicalized to a degree where he/she is ready to com-
mit a terrorist act, he/she is exposed to targeted and intensive radicalization. Re-
gardless of whether the individual has been previously exposed to jihad (like in the 
example of foreign fighter returnees or refugees from one of the existing war zones) 
or not (citizens of European countries without previous war zone experience), the 
catalyst for transformation from a frustrated individual to a jihadist is most often 
exposure to a radical ideology over a continuous (but varying) period of time. This 
exposure may be, but is not necessarily, a byproduct of association with radicalized 
individuals (radical Islamic networks who spread their ideology in European coun-
tries have been documented). Interestingly, the results of the research carried out by 
Neumann and Rogers in 2007 show that none of the radicalized individuals encom-
passed by their research was recruited exclusively online, and the authors conclude 
that online interaction will most probably never entirely replace physical interaction 
(Neumann and Rogers, 2007: 50). In contrast, Simcox’s research of terrorist acts 
conducted by young jihadists in Europe during 2016 showed that only a small frac-
tion (11.8%) of the perpetrators was in actual physical contact with IS operatives, 
while more than 50% of the perpetrators had exclusively virtual contact – via the 
Internet and mobile applications (Simcox, 2017: 22). This data supports the hypo-
thesis that radicalized individuals, often referred to as lone wolves, or as Shuck la-
bels them – satellite martyrs (Shuck, 2015: 64), are becoming increasingly frequent 
perpetrators of terrorist acts in the name of radical Islam (ibid.: 4).
Social Networking Platforms
Social networking platforms, mobile communications applications, websites for 
free content sharing, and numerous tools for encryption and anonymity available 
online, have significantly eased the spread of extremist narratives, and by extension, 
the recruitment of future jihadists throughout the world (TE-SAT Report, 2017: 29). 
The global presence of IS on social networking platforms gives some insight into 
the profile of their operatives who seek to recruit future jihadists in this manner. 
Some theorists believe that it is precisely this presence on the Internet and recruit-
ment via social networking platforms that makes IS different and more successful 
than other radical Islamic organizations (Ristori, 2016: 4). Research confirms the 
broad linguistic and technological abilities of operatives who use the Internet and 
social networking platforms to spread jihadist propaganda (Gates and Podder, 2015: 
2). Morgan Winsor states that IS financially rewards operatives who are successful 
at recruiting over social networking platforms with monetary prizes ranging from 
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2,000 to 10,000 USD per successfully completed recruitment, depending on the 
quality of the individual recruit (Howell, 2017: 14).
Research on the use of the social networking platform Twitter shows that as 
early as 2015, almost 50,000 user accounts that supported and spread radical Is-
lamic ideology and calls to jihad existed (Berger and Morgan, 2015: 2). Certainly, a 
large amount of effort has been undertaken in the last few years to prevent and con-
trol the spread of radical propaganda, including active efforts by Twitter to actively 
track jihadist user accounts and block them. According to Twitter’s official reports, 
from mid 2015 to March of 2017, 636,000 user accounts were shut down in efforts 
to halt the spread of violent extremism.7 However, the disseminators of radical ideo-
logies consistently return,8 and find new ways to communicate with each other and 
with potential jihadists via the Internet (Barrett, 2014: 54).
Alexander Meleagrou and Nick Kaderbhai (2017a: 47) conclude that the most 
significant characteristic of social networking platforms is their ability to adapt con-
tent in a way that is tailored to the specific values and interests of targeted followers, 
and it is this characteristic which makes them so attractive to the disseminators of a 
radical ideology. These findings are supported by Michael Steinbach, assistant direc-
tor of the FBI, who highlighted the problem of the recruitment of adherents of a radi-
cal ideology via social networking platforms as one of the biggest challenges faced 
by security services globally in a lecture at the Washington Institute in September of 
2016 (Steinbach, 2016: 5). That this applies to social networking platforms is illus-
trated by the fact that up until recently, extremist organizations had to wait until po-
tential recruits made the first move (by declaring their interest in an online forum for 
example), while social networking platforms enable vulnerable and willing individu-
als to be flooded with messages that appeal to them. Steinbach goes on to explain 
that radicalization and recruitment no longer occur exclusively when an individual 
accesses a social networking website, but that an increasing role in these processes is 
being played by smart phone applications which are permanently logged in (ibid.: 3).
Mobile Applications
Mobile applications have also created a technological revolution in that they have 
made the Internet, and more specifically certain parts of it, constantly and easily 
available. Besides making access to social networking platforms ubiquitous and 
7 Correction to Twitter report published by Reuters, 21 March 2017. Accessible on: http://www.
reuters.com/article/twitter-extremism/corrected-twitter-suspended-more-than-636000-accounts-
since-2015-to-tackle-extremism-idUSL3N1GY4DU.
8 According to Barett, even the most influential Twitter user accounts associated with IS have 
only between 500 and 1500 followers, which allows them to easily transfer to new user accounts 
if their initial accounts are blocked.
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enabling individuals to constantly track what their peers are doing, saying and shar-
ing with others, they are a vital component of contemporary technologies for the re-
cruitment of potential adherents of radical ideologies because they enable relatively 
secure communications between individuals and groups. Commercially available 
and relatively well encrypted9 applications such as Telegram, Whatsapp, and Vi-
ber (as well as many others) facilitate communication between terrorists (Graham, 
2016: 21). Research by the Pew Research Center shows that 36% of owners of 
smart phones use at least one mobile application for communication, and that 17% 
activate automatic deletion of messages. The same research has shown the 18 to 29 
year old demographic represented uses such apps significantly more than other de-
mographics, with 49% using such applications (Rainnie and Madden, 2015: 26-30). 
At the same time, IS invests great efforts to ensure secure communications 
(Graham, 2016: 2). Media reports state that IS members give detailed instructions 
on secure communications techniques, even producing and publishing videos on the 
Internet with advice and recommendations on such techniques (Coker, 2015). The 
characteristics of mobile applications which enable secure communication have 
established new channels for the radicalization and recruitment of individuals, as 
well as for directing them to commit terrorist acts (Engel, 2015).
The available literature indicates that members and adherents of IS often use 
the Telegram mobile application for communication (Graham, 2016: 22), and Te-
legram has published information detailing their efforts to combat the spread of 
radical ideologies. For example, in December of 2015, Telegram blocked 78 chan-
nels which they had identified as spreading IS ideology in 12 different languages 
(Schechner, 2015).
The Effectiveness of Contemporary Methods of Recruitment 
A limited number of scientific articles regarding the effectiveness of contempo-
rary methods of recruitment (especially those that base their analysis on primary 
sources) exists. Ines von Behr et al. (2013) encompassed 15 radicalized individu-
als in their research, 9 of which had been convicted of committing terrorist acts in 
the United Kingdom. Their research was based on primary sources, interviews with 
perpetrators, court transcripts, and computer databases. Their analysis suggests that 
the Internet is the key source of information, communication and propaganda for 
their subjects (von Behr et al., 2013: xi).
9 Encryption is the process of transforming information or data with the purpose of preventing 
unauthorized access. A large number of encrypted applications for communication which are 
used on contemporary smart phones exist, and each of them has its own user interface, capabili-
ties and security characteristics (Coker, 2015).
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In some of the newest research, Paul Gill et al. (2017) created a database which 
stored data on 223 perpetrators of terrorist acts for whom radicalization via the In-
ternet has been shown. Of the individuals included in the research, 98% were men. 
In 61% of the analyzed cases, a connection between activity on the Internet and 
radicalization and/or the execution of terrorist acts was seen. Interestingly, there 
was a significant increase in the use of the Internet, from 54% to 76%, in prepa-
ration for executing the terrorist act, as compared to an earlier study from 2012 
(ibid.: 103-107). The above mentioned research is the most recent and one of the 
most comprehensive scientific examinations of the effectiveness of radicalization 
and recruitment of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks via the Internet. Even though 
the authors included data about the age of the perpetrators in the data base used for 
analysis, their article does not include an analysis of effectiveness by age group. As 
one of the initial hypotheses of this article is that contemporary methods in recruit-
ing potential perpetrators of terrorist acts in the name of radical ideologies are more 
effective when they target the younger demographic (individuals younger than 30), 
it would be very beneficial to conduct such an analysis on the sample of 223 indi-
viduals, as Gill et al. did. 
Effects on the Younger Demographic
Gill et al. (2017) did not pay particular attention to the analysis of all factors con-
cerning the age of the perpetrators of terrorist acts, but their analysis did show that 
the range of individuals covered in their research was from 16 to 58, where the me-
dian age was 27, the mode was 22, and the mean age was 28 (ibid.: 107). IS recruit-
ing documents, now publicly available, and which have been analyzed by the US 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, have produced valuable insight into the 
adherents of this radical group. These documents identify the average age of jihad-
ists as 26, while at the same time recognizing that the average age of jihadists who 
travel from the West is lower than of those who are not from the West (Kohlma and 
Alkhouri, 2015: 3).
A substantial number of theorists support the hypothesis that jihadist propa-
ganda is most effective when it targets the younger demographic (Milton, 2015), 
and recent events in Europe demonstrate this is so. According to Robin Simcox’s 
research, jihadist propaganda is very effective in engaging its young audience (Sim-
cox, 2017: 22). Simcox specifies that the youngest European terrorist is a 12 year 
old arrested in December of 2016 for trying to activate an explosive device at the 
Christmas fair in Ludwigshafen, Germany (ibid.: 23). The same author identifies 
numerous examples and statistics in support of the hypothesis that contemporary 
methods of recruiting adherents to radical ideologies are especially effective on the 
younger demographic. The ages of foreign fighters arriving from Europe to Syria 
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and Iraq range from 18 to 29, which is significantly less than in previous conflicts 
such as Afghanistan, where the ages ranged from 25 to 35 (ibid.). Rachel Briggs 
and Tanya Silverman, in their book Western Foreign Fighters: Innovations in Re-
sponding to the Threat, quote Raffaell Pantucci, whose research demonstrated that 
the conflict in Syria is primarily attractive to teenagers, even though the average 
age of French citizens who participated in this jihad was 27, while the average age 
of Belgian and British citizens who participated was 23.5 (Briggs and Silverman, 
2014: 12).
The series of terrorist attacks in Paris in November of 2015, with the most fa-
talities resulting form the shootings in the Bataclan concert hall, were conducted by 
jihadists who were all younger than 30 years of age.10 Abdelhemid Abaaoud, a Bel-
gian citizen who coordinated the attacks, was only 29 years old at the time,11 while 
the other perpetrators were even younger: Salah Abdeslam (26), Chakib Akrouh 
(25), Omar Ismael Mostefai (29), Samy Amimour (28), Foued Mohammed Aggad 
(23), Ahmad el Mohammad (25) and Bilal Hadfi (20).12 For the terrorist attack in 
Berlin on 16 April 2016,13 the underage suspects are members of the Abu Walaa14 
network Yusuf T., Mohammed B. and Toldga I., who was only 16 at the time of the 
attacks (Kampf, 2016). The Nice attack in July of 2016 was executed by 27 year old 
Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, while the Manchester concert attack was committed 
by 22 year old Salman Abedi. 
For committing two coordinated terrorist attacks involving vehicles in August 
2017 in the Spanish cities of Barcelona and Cambrilis, Mousssa Oukabir (17), El 
Houssaine Abouyaaqoub (19), Said Aallaa (19), Omar Hychami (21) and Mohamed 
Hychami (24) were arrested.15 The most recent terrorist attack at a railway station 
in London in September 2017 was conducted by a group of radicalized youths, the 
youngest of whom was only 18 years old. In the nearly 50 attacks and attempted 
10 According to the analysis of publicly available data on perpetrated terrorist acts which the au-
thor briefly outlined in the table at the end of this article.
11 From: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34835046.
12 From: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512.
13 An explosive device detonated next to a Sikh temple in Essen and injured three people (Rein-
er, 2016).
14 According to the transcripts of the German Federal Prosecutor and documents from the pro-
secution against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic and Abdulaziz Abdulah in Heil, 2017. Abu 
Walaa was identified as the highest ranking representative of IS in Germany, and it is assessed 
that he was the key coordinator of terrorist activities in Germany, but also in other European 
countries based on intelligence on the network of which he was the head and its penetration 
throughout Europe.
15 According to: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/aug/18/barcelona-cambrils-ter-
ror-attack-suspects-killed-latest-updates.
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attacks during 2016 and 2017 which were analyzed in the course of researching this 
article, the mean age of the jihadists was 27.21 years. The data used in this analysis 
was collected from publicly published information on planned and executed terror-
ist acts, and involved only those perpetrators whose direct involvement was proven. 
Figure 2 illustrates the analysis results which support the hypothesis suggest-
ing higher effectiveness of recruitment methods on the younger target demographic, 
as well as supporting the results of the research conducted by Gill et al., Pantucci, 
Briggs, Silverman and other theorists who have studied this topic.
Taking into account the research results illustrated above, or the fact that con-
temporary methods of potential jihadist recruitment have a significant effect on the 
targeted demographic who are more computer savvy and spend more time online, 
and data about the perpetrators of terrorist acts in the name of radical Islam, it is 
clear that jihadist recruitment methods that rely on the Internet and mobile com-
munications applications will continue to be a topic of interest for research in the 
future.
According to Simcox, the dissemination of jihadist propaganda via the Inter-
net is the most important reason that IS has been able to achieve such spectacular 
results in this demographic group (Simcox, 2017: 21). According to the research 
conducted by the American Pew Research Center, only 1 percent of the representa-
tives of the 18 to 29 demographic group do not use the Internet (Anderson and Per-
rin, 2016), while 56% of individuals older than 18 use at least one of the five largest 
social networking platforms – Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin, Instagram or Pinterest 
(Greenwood et al., 2016: 10).
Figure 2. Average Age of Jihadist by European Country for Terrorist Acts Committed 
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Conclusion
Extremist organizations like IS have recently been extraordinarily effective in ex-
ploiting contemporary recruitment methods in order to attract and motivate their ad-
herents and future jihadists. However, besides succeeding in their objectives, their 
aggressive propaganda has triggered a reaction in the international community and 
facilitated coordinated countermeasures (Shuck, 2015: 64).
Taking into account the four categories of potential jihadists described in this 
article, the vulnerabilities which make them more susceptible to recruitment by 
radical groups include, but are not limited to: socioeconomic status, cultural differ-
ences, a sense of ethnic belonging (or lack thereof), religious convictions, and/or 
psychological factors (Charnock and Bouzar, 2017). Thus, that which makes an in-
dividual receptive to radical propaganda is the fact that for one of the above men-
tioned reasons, a lack of self-realization (Brzica, 2012: 119), or because he/she has 
inflated expectations regarding life in the European countries (this in particular ap-
plies to migrants), he/she is confronted with an inability to realize his/her objec-
tives. The individual then turns to other means of self-realization and becomes a 
suitable target for recruitment. A majority of potential perpetrators of terrorist at-
tacks in the name of radical ideologies (within the context of this article this refers 
primarily to those who are represented in the last three categories) have in com-
mon a level of radicalization and readiness to commit terrorist attacks that depends 
mostly on the propaganda that they are exposed to, most often on social networking 
platforms like Twitter (ICSR Report, 2014).
Figure 3. Age Structure of Jihadists Who Have Committed Terrorist Acts in Europe 
from November 2015 to September 2017
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Furthermore, from the analysis of planned and conducted terrorist acts within 
Europe from November 2015 to September 2017 illustrated by Figure 3 above, it is 
evident that the mean age of the perpetrators of these acts is 27.21 years, that 20.63 
percent of perpetrators are younger than 20, and that almost 60 percent are between 
20 and 30 years of age. If extremist organizations like IS continue to aggressive-
ly recruit new adherents via the Internet and other contemporary communication 
methods that are popular among the younger population, it is expected that their 
effectiveness will remain significant. However, in the research that preceded the 
writing of this article, no theoretical evidence which would indicate that the radi-
calization and recruitment of identified perpetrators of terrorist acts committed in 
Europe between November 2015 and September 2017 transpired using solely con-
temporary recruiting methods. Because of this, one can conclude that despite the 
ever increasing use of social networking platforms and mobile applications, and of, 
most likely, an increasing effect on the target demographic, this method of recruit-
ing adherents to a radical ideology is but one of many factors that help harden their 
motivation, intent and capability to commit terrorist acts in the name of a radical 
ideology (Gill et al., 2017: 114).
The above mentioned, alongside the fact that it is increasingly apparent that 
the degree of radicalization which is necessary for a young person who is a citizen 
of a European country to be recruited and decide to commit a terrorist act, in reality 
does not require direct physical contact of that individual with jihad, jihadists and 
a war zone, illustrates the need for a detailed scientifically sound and multidisci-
plinary approach to this problem. Furthermore, keeping in mind the distinction be-
tween radicalization and recruitment, future empirical research also must be direct-
ed towards understanding the reasons why a significant portion of individuals who 
have likewise been exposed to radical ideologies on the Internet, despite everything 
elaborated in this article, decide not to manifest political violence (Meleagrou and 
Kaderbhai, 2017a: 14).
Starting from the conclusions of this article, and keeping in mind the scientific 
opus of authors such as Gill et al., Berger, Neumann, Shuck and others, the under-
taking of comprehensive scientific research on the actual effectiveness contempo-
rary methods of recruitment have on the perpetrators of terrorist acts in the name of 
radical ideologies is a challenge in which a large number of international research-
ers with access to restricted information (or even the perpetrators themselves) must 
participate. 
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Appendix
Table 1. Planned and Committed Terrorist Attacks in Europe in the Period 
from November 2015 until September 2017
Month/Year Country City Dead Injured Age of Perpetrator
1 September 2017 France Bourgogne 0 2 18
2 September 2017 UK London 0 29 18, 21
3 September 2017 France Toulouse 0 7 40
4 August 2017 Sweden Stockholm 0 1 29
5 August 2017 Belgium Bruxelles 0 2 30
6 August 2017 UK London 0 3 26
7 August 2017 Finland Turku 2 6 18
8 August 2017 Spain Barcelona 14 130 22
9 August 2017 Spain Cambrils 1 6 22
10 August 2017 Spain Barcelona 1 0 17, 24, 21, 19, 19
11 August 2017 Spain Alcanar 1 6 20
12 August 2017 France Paris 0 6 37
13 July 2017 Germany Hamburg 1 4 26
14 July 2017 UK Norfolk 0 2 26
15 July 2017 Italy Milan 0 1 31
16 June 2017 Austria Linz 2 0 54
17 June 2017 Belgium Bruxelles 0 0 30
18 June 2017 France Paris 0 0 31
19 June 2017 France Lot et Garonne 0 1 39
20 June 2017 France Paris 0 1 22
21 June 2017 UK London 8 48 27, 30, 22
22 May 2017 UK Manchester 22 119 22
23 April 2017 Germany Prien am 
Chiemsee
1 0 29
24 April 2017 France Reunion 0 2 20
25 April 2017 France Paris 1 2 39
26 April 2017 Sweden Stockholm 5 14 39
27 March 2017 UK London 5 29 52
28 January 2017 Turkey Istanbul 39 69 34
29 December 2016 Germany Berlin 12 48 24
30 December 2016 Germany Ludwigshafen 0 0 12
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31 October 2016 Germany Hamburg 1 1 23
32 August 2016 Turkey Gaziantep 57 94 13
33 August 2016 UK London 1 5 19
34 July 2016 France Nice 86 202 27
35 June 2016 Turkey Istanbul 44 239 32
36 May 2016 Germany Grafing 1 3 27
37 April 2016 UK Manchester 1 0 22
38 April 2016 Germany Essen 0 3 16
39 March 2016 Scotland Glasgow 1 0 32
40 March 2016 Belgium Bruxelles 14 92 29, 24, 33, 27, 25
42 March 2016 Turkey Istanbul 4 39 25
43 February 2016 UK Rochdale 1 0 21
44 January 2016 Turkey Istanbul 12 14 29
45 November 2015 France Paris 119 340 29, 26, 25, 29, 28, 23, 25, 20
MEDIAN = 27,21462963
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